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It is time to move away from policy witchcraft and into an era
where evidence is taken seriously
Adrian Beecroft’s report on employment law has angered many who feel his recommendations
are partisan and seek to erode a number of worker ’s rights. John Van Reenan argues that
although the report is both timely and addresses key issues in regulation, Beecroft appears to
have ignored the wealth of research into the economic effects of employment laws. This
evidence goes against his view that relaxing employment laws will generate large economic
improvements in the UK.
Adrian Beecrof t’s report on employment law makes some radical recommendations to
deregulate UK employment laws, f or example making it much easier to dismiss workers. When reluctantly
released in mid-May, the report generated a polit ical row as the author is a major donor to the Conservative
party and provoked Vince Cable, UK Secretary of  State f or Business and Innovation, into dismissing the
“bonkers” proposals. In reply Beecrof t labelled Cable an anti-business socialist.I am sympathetic with the
need to ref orm needless regulations and there are sensible proposals in Beecrof t to make it easier to
employ f oreign workers through f aster work permit checks and simplif ying the immigration system. At a t ime
when the UK is being perceived to be an unwelcome home to global talent this is to be welcomed.
But the most depressing thing about the report and the rancorous public debate around it is the total lack
of  any evidence on the likely impact of  the proposals. Beecrof t claimed that GDP would increase by 5 per
cent through employment law ref orms – a huge increase which would restore UK output f rom its current
posit ion of  under 4 per cent below 2008 output, back to pre-crisis levels.  Unf ortunately, this 5 per cent
appears to be plucked f rom thin air, as if  by witchcraf t. There is no evidence presented at all in the Beecrof t
report to gauge such benef its. All I could f ind was a breezy sentence or two like “Quantif ying the loss of
jobs arising f rom the burden of  regulation is an impossible task.” (p.6).
Putting aside the f act that this statement contradicts the claim of  an additional 5 per cent growth,
there is in f act a substantial body of  evidence on the economic ef f ects of  employment laws. Indeed, it has
been one of  the most studied areas in economics over the last decade or two. It is unclear whether
Beecrof t is ignorant of  this work or thinks it is entirely wrong or irrelevant. But as I discussed on the BBC’s
“More or Less” this weekend here is a more detailed summary of  the empirical evidence which, in short,
does not support Beecrof t’s assertions. For the more wonkish readers I of f er some of  the theory later
af ter f irst discussing the empirical evidence
 Empirical Evidence of the Effects of Employment Protection Laws (EPL)
The main empirical evidence on the Ef f ects of  Employment Protection Laws (EPLs) comes f rom using
indicators of  the “toughness” of  these laws and regulations. These are quantif ied by various organizations
such as the OECD and the World Bank. The OECD’s latest indicators are in Figure 1 below, f or example.
They show that the UK had the lowest degree of  protection in Europe and third lowest of  all the countries
examined by the OECD (only the US and Canada had weaker protection). This suggests that ref orming EPL
is hardly the Number 1 priority f or raising UK growth rates.
Figure 1: OECD Index of the strength of Employment Laws. UK third weakest protection of
workers, latest data (compiled in 2010)
Notes: Data are for 2009 for France and Portugal and 2008 for other countries. OECD average is the
unweighted average for the 30 countries that were members of the OECD in 2008. Source is available online. 
Nevertheless, maybe some relaxing of  EPL could have some more modest posit ive ef f ects. The typical
approach to examine this question is to analyze what happens when employment laws are weakened and
see whether this is associated with any increase in unemployment, controlling f or other f actors that could
inf luence joblessness such as the overall state of  demand and the generosity of  unemployment benef its,
etc. Early approaches looked at a point of  t ime, but more recent approaches look at changes over several
years (both upwards and downwards) which is better as it controls f or many country- level f actors (e.g.
culture).
The bottom line? The conclusion of  the vast majority of  studies is that there is no signif icant ef f ect, i.e.
tougher EPL does not increase unemployment (but neither do they reduce them). Don’t just take my word
f or it – this was also the conclusion of  the OECD’s voluminous 2012 summary on growth policies (e.g.
p.173).
This approach was pioneered by Prof essor Stephen Nickell, now at the Of f ice of  Budget Responsibility,
when he was at the Centre f or Economic Perf ormance. For example see his summary in the
magisterial Unemployment book or classic 1997 Journal of Economic Perspectives article.  His most
recent paper on this looked at 20 countries (including the UK) f or over three decades (1961-1995) f inding
essentially zero ef f ects of  EPL on unemployment. By contrast, other labour market institutions such as the
duration and level of  benef it durations, the ef f ectiveness of  the Employment Service, training polices and
unions were important in af f ecting unemployment.  It is here, rather than EPL, which should be the main
targets f or ref orm.
Grif f ith et al (2007) took a similar approach to Nickell using more recent data between 1986 and 2000. Their
main results (e.g. Table 3 columns 1-4) actually f ound that tougher EPL reduced unemployment, but this
ef f ect was statistically insignif icant (i.e. they could not reject a zero ef f ect). By contrast, toughening
competit ion in the product market had a robust ef f ect on reducing unemployment. It would be very
surprising if  Beecrof t and his team were unaware of  this paper as one of  the co-authors, Rupert Harrison,
is currently the Chancellor of  the Exchequer’s special economic advisor (in the interests of  f ull disclosure I
should mention that I was also Rupert’s PhD supervisor). Perhaps communications between No 10 and No
11 are not so much better than they were in the Brown-Blair years af ter all.
Firm-level Evidence
Beecrof t could argue that all this macro evidence is f lawed and could cite reasons such as (1) measuring
the laws is so hard and (2) there are so many other things happening at the country- level it is impossible to
adequately control f or them. Of  course, these problems could bias the ef f ect upwards to over-estimate the
negative ef f ect of  EPL as well as to underestimate them. Nevertheless, it is usef ul to look at the growing
micro-economic literature which examines f irms and plants rather than entire economies.
This micro evidence does not give much comf ort to Beecrof t either. There do appear to be af f ects of  EPL
on f irm behaviour, but it is hard to f ind that these are suf f iciently large in magnitude to believe that his
recommendations would have any major posit ive ef f ect on GDP.
Let me take one study I have been involved in which looks at the case of  France where EPL increases very
substantially when f irms reach 50 employees. French f irms respond to the increase in costs by choosing to
remain small – there is a big spike of  f irms who are just below the threshold at 48-49 employees to avoid
the regulation.  This reduces total output as many of  these f irms would like to grow and employ more
people but are deterred f rom doing so by the regulation, just as Beecrof t alleges. But this ef f ect is not
huge – very ef f icient f irms will still choose to pay the regulatory “tax” and become large. For example, a
1,000 employee f irm is not likely to shed 950 of  its workers simply to avoid the regulation.
There is a similar story in other countries. Mario Monti has (correctly in my view) been involved in a drive to
reduce the heavy f iring costs in Italian f irms who are larger than 15 employees. As in my French study,
Torrini and Schivaldi f ound that f irms just below the 15 cut-of f  are much less likely to grow. But again, in
aggregate the ef f ects are relatively modest and cannot cause large changes in employment or output.
France and Italy are two countries where labour regulation is very tough (see Figure 1) so there is a big
room f or improvement. For the UK with a very f lexible regime already the supposed benef its of  loosening
EPL are likely to be even more minor.
The studies also highlight a f urther problem with creating more EPL exemptions f or small f irms as Beecrof t
recommends. As the regulations kick in when f irms get large they will be reluctant to grow. These size-
contingent regulations can reduce the incentives of  small f irms to become larger, ef f ectively subsidising
companies to remain inef f iciently small.
Theory: What are the pros and cons of Employment Protection Laws?
The downsides of  EPL are well rehearsed in Beecrof t. Larger f iring costs increases labour costs and so
makes employers reluctant to hire more workers which will lead to unemployment and loss of  output. There
could be more subtle ef f ects as well. Because workers know that they are less likely to be f ired they may
slack of f  and managers will try less hard to identif y and remove underperf orming employees. Similarly, the
protected “insider” workers may drive up wages, saf e in the knowledge they won’t be f ired. Higher average
wages will mean even higher employer costs and so even f ewer jobs. It might be particularly hard f or
individuals more on the f ringes of  the labour market like the young, women and long-term unemployed.
On the other side of  the ledger, f iring costs mean that f ewer workers will be involuntarily dismissed. This
reduces the level of  unemployment in a downturn, at least temporarily. Obviously, EPL is of ten desired by
workers as it gives them greater saf ety and security (as long as they have jobs). More subtly, this benef it
may lead them to accept lower wages and this can of f set the increase in labour costs as Edward Lazear,
f ormer head of  George Bush’s Council f or Economic Advisors has argued. In some cases this can mean
that the entire additional cost of  the employment regulation is born by workers in the f orm of  lower wages,
leaving unemployment completely unaf f ected. Of  course, this ef f ect will be limited in the presence of
binding minimum wages or high unemployment benef its.
The lower turnover f rom reduced hiring and f iring that result f rom EPL may mean that there is more
prof essionalisation of  careers. For example, f irms and workers may invest more in training as jobs are
longer and more stable. Finally, since the state pays unemployment benef its (and this social cost is ignored
by f irms when making) there may be an inef f iciently high level of  layof f s as argued by IMF Chief  Economist,
Olivier Blanchard. In these circumstances EPL can sometimes act as an ef f icient “layof f  tax”.
The upshot of  this is that the theoretical ef f ects of  EPL on jobs and output is an empirical issue and
cannot be decided one way or the other based on theory or “common sense”.
Some of  the Beecrof t report is sensible such as the need to make the hiring of  f oreign workers easier f or
employers. But policy needs to be based on evidence not just on casual anecdote and assertion. Too many
of  the government’s policies seem to be based on ideology rather than pragmatism and if  Beecrof t is an
example of  policy f ormation we can see why. There is not even an attempt to engage in the wide body of
evidence by academics and international bodies like the OECD, IMF, ILO and World Bank. At the LSE Growth
Commission we are amassing more systematic evidence of  what policies are good f or long-term UK
growth.
It ’s t ime to move away f rom policy witchcraf t and into an era where evidence is taken seriously.
Note: This article gives the views of the author(s), and not the position of the Impact of Social Sciences blog,
nor of the London School of Economics
This blog post was originally published on the LSE’s British Politics and Policy blog.  
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